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Abstract 
In this study, we question whether the relationship between unemployment and mental health 
care use, controlling for mental health status, varies across European countries. And whether 
these differences are patterned by a combination of unemployment and health care 
generosity. We hypothesize that medicalization of unemployment is stronger in countries 
where a low level of unemployment generosity is combined with a high level of health care 
generosity. A subsample of 36,306 working-age respondents from rounds 64.4 (2005–2006) 
and 73.2 (2010) of the cross-national survey, Eurobarometer, is used. Country-specific 
logistic regression and multilevel analyses, controlling for public disability spending, changes 
in government spending, economic capacity, and unemployment rate, are performed. We find 
that in the majority of the 24 nations, unemployment is medicalized at least to some degree. 
Moreover, the medicalization of unemployment varies substantially across countries, 
corresponding to the combination of the level of unemployment and of health care generosity.  
 
Keywords 
medicalization, employment status, mental health care use, health care generosity, 
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As a recent meta-analysis of cross-sectional and longitudinal studies showed, the negative 
relationship between unemployment and mental health is well established (Paul and Moser 
2009), but much less is known about how unemployment translates into the utilization of 
mental health care (MHC). Few studies have explored the relationship between employment 
status and health care use, and these use the consumption of health services or medication as 
a proxy for mental health problems (Schmitz 2011; Virtanen et al. 2008). This is a significant 
limitation, given that MHC and antidepressant use among the unemployed is not exclusively 
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need based (Bijl and Ravelli 2000; Buffel, Dereuddre, and Bracke 2015; Buffel, van de 
Straat, and Bracke 2015; Yuen and Balarajan 1989). Previous research confirms that the 
unemployed have higher MHC and medication use than expected based on their mental 
health status, which has been interpreted as an indication of the medicalization of 
unemployment (Buffel, Dereuddre, and Bracke 2015; Buffel, van de Straat, and Bracke 
2015).  
An even more striking limitation of existing research into unemployment, health, and 
MHC utilization is the lack of cross-national comparative research (Bambra and Eikemo 
2009). In the current context of high unemployment rates and health care expenditure in 
many wealthy democracies, and also austerity policies implemented in many European 
countries that have led to cutbacks in public expenditures, it is crucial to understand whether, 
how, and why unemployment drives MHC utilization differently in different nations.  
In this study, we investigate first whether the relationship between unemployment and 
MHC use, controlling for mental health status, varies across European countries. Second, we 
explore whether these differences across countries are patterned by a combination of 
unemployment policies as well as health care system characteristics, including disability 
benefits, which bridge the policy domains of welfare and health care. Third, we analyze how 
the level of generosity in both policy domains shapes the relationship between unemployment 
and mental health care use. Analyzing these relationships with data before and after the start 
of the recent economic recession in Europe, which sparked austerity policies in many 
countries, allows us to shed light on the role of austerity politics in connecting unemployment 
and mental health (Beatty and Fothergill 2015).  
We use cross-national survey data from the Eurobarometer wave 64.4 (2005/2006) 
and 73.2 (2010), because these data are uniquely suited for our purpose: the samples are 
nationally representative, the institutional variation is vast (given that the Eurobarometer 
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includes dozens of countries), and most importantly, unlike other cross-national surveys the 
Eurobarometer includes questions about employment status, mental health status, and MHC-
utilization. Prior research on the connection between unemployment and mental health has 
had to use mental health care utilization as a proxy for mental illness, but the Eurobarometer 
data uniquely allow us to relax the assumption of a close correspondence between MHC 
utilization and mental illness. 
 
BACKGROUND  
Medicalizing Unemployment and the Gaps in Current Medicalization Research  
Medicalization describes a process by which non-medical (social) problems–such as 
unemployment–are defined and/or treated as medical problems (Conrad 1992). Hitherto, the 
lion’s share of studies about medicalization has taken a social constructivist approach. The 
focus is on the construction of new medical categories and its subsequent expansion of 
medical jurisdiction, such as studies of the medicalization of hyperactivity, menopause, 
posttraumatic stress disorder and alcoholism (Conrad 2005). Such work has developed an 
extensive conceptual and empirical literature on the process and effects of medicalization, 
although the range of institutional contexts within which medicalization has been studied is 
relatively limited. This limitation has truncated the range of institutional factors that have 
been considered as potential foundations for medicalization. 
Our theoretical contribution to existing medicalization literature integrates insights 
from comparative political economy research in order to identify the institutional foundations 
for medicalization. We thus address several limitations of existing research inspired by 
medicalization theory, as developed by Conrad (1992), and Conrad and Leiter (2004). First, 
we develop a novel technique for measuring medicalization, building on related cross-
national comparative work on medicalization (Christiaens and Bracke 2014; Moloney, 
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Konrad, and Zimmer 2011; Olafsdottir 2007; Zheng 2011). Our innovation is to measure and 
interpret MHC utilization beyond actual need, as an indicator of medicalization that can be 
compared across societies. In other words, and as presented on Figure 1, if the mental health 
care use of the unemployed is higher than that of the employed, and this can only partly be 
ascribed to their poorer mental health status, we see this as an indication of medicalizing 
unemployment.  
As a result, medicalization of unemployment will be explored in one specific domain: 
the use of medical care in the mental health field. We have to be aware of the fact that 
medicalization of unemployment can also be examined in other societal areas, such as in 
national discourses on unemployment as a personal failure, a deviant position or 
psychological deficit. Moreover, unemployment can also be medicalized in order to create the 
possibility of relying on the more stable, less stigmatizing and often more generous disability 
benefits instead of unemployment benefits (Beatty and Fothergill 2005). Labor market 
inactivity of those who rely on disability benefits for income support is sometimes known as 
‘hidden unemployment’; Arguments in the literature over the blurry boundary between the 
inactive and the disabled prevent precise identification of hidden-unemployment effects 
(Bratsberg, Fevang, and Roed 2010; Koning and van Vuuren 2006). Our analysis addresses 
this in two ways: first, by excluding respondents who report being out of the labour market 
due to disability, and second, by controlling for public expenditures on disability benefits 
using data from Eurostat and other sources. 
  
[Figure 1 around here]  
 
Second, we contribute to the developing cross-national comparative approach to 
understanding medicalization (Olafsdottir 2007, 2010). Our innovation in this regard, in view 
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of the trend toward deinstitutionalization in the European mental health sector (Hermans, de 
Witte, and Dom 2012), is to relax the assumption that physicians and hospitals are the (only) 
key actors in medicalization, and to recognize that multiple power actors–the pharmaceutical 
industry, policymakers, and patients or health care consumers–also contribute to the process 
of medicalization (Clarke and Shim 2011; Conrad 2005; Conrad and Barker 2010). Third, we 
advance the integration of medicalization research across levels of analysis (Conrad 2005). 
We apply multi-level modeling techniques to evaluate the hypothesis that medicalization, as a 
cultural transformation that varies across institutional settings, shapes the health behavior of 
individuals, such as consulting with medical professionals.  
In addition, multilevel analysis of data collected before and after the onset of 
economic recession and austerity policies allows us to address the relation between austerity 
and the medicalization of unemployment. Previous studies (Antonakakis and Collins 2015; 
Karamessini and Rubery 2013; Karanikolos et al. 2013; Kondilis et al. 2013; McKee, 
Karanikolos, Belcher, and Stuckler 2012) have already indicated that cutbacks in government 
expenditures may have an impact on the employment and unemployment conditions, (mental) 
health outcomes, and the consumption of health services. Fiscal austerity has for example 
recently led to a decline in health care access in Greece (Kentikelenis et al. 2011). 
 
Unemployment Generosity and its Relation to Medicalizing Unemployment 
We investigate whether the relationship between unemployment and medical care use is 
moderated by welfare generosity in the areas of unemployment and health care. Our measure 
of generosity, taken from Scruggs et al. (2013), captures not only the level of benefit 
payments, but also the conditionality and strictness of entitlements that affect the level of 
coverage (e.g., targeted benefits versus universal benefits). Similarly, generosity of health 
care is the degree to which health care is delivered as a social right of citizenship, rather than 
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as something to be purchased in the medical marketplace. In line with the work of Scruggs 
(2014), who builds on earlier work on decommodification by Esping-Andersen (1990), we 
use the term ‘generosity’ to engage with institutionalist research on welfare-state effects on 
population health (Beckfield et al. 2015), to highlight the improvements in measurement 
since Esping-Anderson’s pioneering work, and to emphasize the use of more recent data and 
the coverage of more European countries.  
Countries characterized by a low level of unemployment generosity are, for example, 
the United Kingdom (Bambra 2005b; Jensen 2008) and several Eastern European states. In 
these, the social protection system for the unemployed is relatively weak, with less generous 
income replacement rates and strict entitlement criteria, which may increase financial stress 
and lessen the feeling of self-control (Strandh 2001). The maximum duration of a standard 
unemployment benefit is, for example in the UK, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Czech 
Republic, 26 weeks, which is the shortest duration of the European countries included in this 
study. Thereafter, the unemployed in the UK can only rely on mean-tested benefits. However, 
it is known that such benefits can be highly stigmatizing (Diderichsen 2002; Eikemo et al. 
2008; Rodriguez, Frongillo, and Chandra 2001). The unemployed are often considered to be 
responsible for their situation (Bambra and Eikemo 2009), which can stimulate self-blame 
and the perception of having failed and being socially excluded. All these factors may be 
associated with medicalizing unemployment. As result we can expect that in countries with a 
low level of unemployment generosity, unemployment will be more strongly related to 
mental health care use (See Figure 2.a). 
 
     [Figure 2.a around here] 
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Although a consistent negative relationship between unemployment and well-being, 
health, and mental health has been observed in previous research (Bambra and Eikemo 2009; 
Strandh 2001; Wulfgramm 2014), in countries with a high level of unemployment generosity 
, such as some Scandinavian countries (Esping-Andersen 1987, 1990), the medicalization of 
unemployment may be weaker. There is strong protection for the unemployed through highly 
interventionist governments, which value principles such as universalism and social equality 
(Bambra and Eikemo 2009). In Norway, for example, only 4 weeks of employment are 
needed to qualify for an unemployment benefit (this is the shortest qualifying period in 
Europe), while in Germany and Italy this is 104 weeks (two of the longest qualifying 
periods). In the more generous welfare states, the level of benefits is also relatively high, and 
since they are not means-tested but rather universalist, stigmatization may be lower. As a 
result, unemployment may be less stressful and related to reduced negative feelings of self-
blame and personal failure. Unemployment may be considered more as a social problem, 
which requires a structural approach. This expectation is in line with a previous study, which 
found that mental health problems in Iceland are perceived more as social problems with 
social solutions, whereas in the United States they are viewed as individual problems 
requiring an individual approach; and are indeed more medicalized in the US (Olafsdottir 
2010).  
 
Health Care Generosity and its Relation to Medicalizing Unemployment 
Institutional conditions and welfare policies may not only have an impact on how 
unemployment is experienced and how it affects individuals’ mental health and demand for 
MHC and medication, but also on the access to and availability of the resources needed to 
make medicalization of unemployment possible. Therefore, in addition to the role of 
unemployment generosity, we also explore the role of health care generosity. 
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Although health care is one of the key dimensions of all modern welfare states, it is 
relatively absent from major welfare-state theories, as is the case with Esping-Andersen’s 
work (Bambra 2005b; Jensen 2008). In response to this limitation, Bambra (2005a, 2005b) 
introduced the concept of health care decommodification. It covers the provision of care, the 
degree to which this provision is independent from the market, and the extent to which an 
individual’s access is dependent on their market position. The indicators included in our 
health care generosity measurement assess the financing, provision, and coverage of the 
private sector, and are therefore useful indicators of the varied role of the market in a health 
care system. The larger the size of the private health sector, in terms of expenditure and 
consumption, the larger the role of the market; and therefore the lower the degree of health 
care generosity (Bambra 2005a). The UK with 100% coverage, and only 3.7% private 
hospital beds (of the total bed stock) and 1.72 % private health expenditure (% of the GDP) 
has a relatively high level of health care generosity, while for example Belgium (99.0% 
covered) and Germany (89.1% covered) with respectively 61.8% and 59.3%, private hospital 
beds and 2.54% and 2.74% private health expenditure, have a relatively low level of health 
care generosity. We can expect that in countries with a high level of health care generosity, 
the unemployed will be less constrained in their medical care use (See Figure 2.b). 
 
[Figure 2.b around here] 
 
In sum, based on this theoretical framework, we can hypothesize that a combination 
of low unemployment generosity and high health care generosity–with the UK as an 
illustration–will trigger the medicalization of unemployment. In this situation, the 
unemployed will possibly perceive greater stigmatization of and individual responsibility for 
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unemployment. These correlates of mental illness, then, may facilitate increased MHC, in 
generous healthcare systems.  
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
In Figure 4, the countries are shown according to their combined unemployment 
generosity and health care generosity (please see the measurement section below for details). 
Typical countries characterized by the inverse combination of above–namely with a quite 
high level of unemployment generosity, while a low level of health care generosity–are 
Belgium and Bulgaria, the first especially regarding its high unemployment generosity level, 
and the later concerning its low level of health care generosity. Greece is a typical country 
with low levels on both generosity measurements–especially following the implementation of 
austerity policies demanded by the EU and IMF–while the Netherlands, Denmark and France 
are modal countries with relatively high levels on both generosity measures.  
 
   [Figure 4 around here] 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The Eurobarometer Survey 
The current study uses data from the Eurobarometer rounds 64.4 (2005–2006) and 73.2 
(2010),1 which includes information about a general population aged 15 and above in more 
than 20 European Union member states. The European Commission has carried out the 
Eurobarometer survey since 1973, to monitor public opinion. The Eurobarometer 
occasionally includes special items, such as questions about smoking, which have been used 
in health research (e.g. Pampel 2001). To our knowledge, the Eurobarometer is the only 
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cross-national survey that combines (a) nationally-representative samples, (b) measurements 
of mental health status, (c) measurements of MHC utilization, (d) employment status, and (e) 
broad cross-national institutional variation. The basic sample design used in all countries 
comprises a multi-stage, random (probability) sample of individuals within households within 
an area. Interviews were conducted face-to-face in the national language. To ensure 
nationally-representative samples, post-stratification weights are applied to restore specific 
town size, age, and gender distributions for the general population in each country, using the 
most recent census data. For our purposes, it is appropriate for small countries such as 
Belgium to be weighted the same as large countries such as Germany (Frohlich 2001). 
Unweighted analyses yield estimations that are more valid and we do not weight the samples 
according to population size, as the population sizes of the sampled countries are highly 
heterogeneous2. In addition, because our interest is in the institutional foundations of 
medicalization, in this case national welfare-state policies regarding unemployment and 
health care. Following precedent in the literature (Bracke et al. 2010; Buffel, Dereuddre, and 
Bracke 2015), we merge data from East and West Germany, and from Northern Ireland and 
the rest of the United Kingdom.  
The datasets include 24 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK).  
We use a subsample limited to respondents of working age (20–65 years old), which 
results in 37,477 respondents. Because no variable contains more than approximately 2% 
missing values, the accumulated number of missing values is 1,171. These cases are omitted 
from the sample. As a result, the final sample contains information for 36,306 respondents. 
Descriptive statistics and the sample size per country are provided in online Appendix A. 
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Measurements 
For the analysis of medical healthcare utilization, two dichotomous outcome variables for 
medical mental health care use were constructed: contacting a general practitioner (GP) 
and/or contacting a psychiatrist (each item coded 1=yes; 0=no). 
The main independent variables are employment status and mental health status. 
Employment status contains three categories: employed (reference group), unemployed, and 
non-employed. Non-employed includes homemakers, students, retired people, and those 
unable to work due to illness or disability. Mental health is measured with the five-item 
version of the Mental Health Inventory (MHI-5), a subscale of the SF-36 Version 2 (Ware 
and Sherbourne 1992). The scale measures depression and anxiety-related complaints, and 
ranges from 1 (good mental health) to 5 (poor mental health). If one or two items were 
missing, mean substitution was applied. The internal reliability of the MHI-5 scale is good 
(Cronbach’s alpha is  .803) and there is evidence for its validity (Mchorney, Ware, and 
Raczek 1993) and comparability across countries (Lehto-Järnstedt 2003). 
Age is measured in years. Period is a categorical variable: 2005–2006 and 2010, with 
2005–2006 used as the reference category. To examine within-country differences in the 
provision of health care services, we control for the degree of urbanization using the 
following categories:3 large town (reference category), rural area or village, and small or 
medium-sized town. This can be considered as a proxy for supply, because the availability of 
medical professionals may vary from a large city to a more rural area (Saxena et al. 2007). In 
addition, attitudes concerning MHC may differ by urbanization, with a greater reluctance to 
seek professional help in rural areas (Hoyt et al. 1997). We also control for marital status 
(married [reference category], divorced, widowed, or single) and educational level. The 
respondents were asked at what age they finished full-time education, and the European 
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Commission (Eurobarometer) provides a standard categorization for the answers: aged up to 
15 (reference category), aged 16–19, and aged 20 and above. This corresponds approximately 
to primary, secondary, and tertiary education.  
At the country level, our central independent variables are the level of unemployment 
generosity and the level of health care generosity. To construct the unemployment generosity 
measurement, we rely on Scruggs’ updated “unemployment generosity measure” (Scruggs 
and Allan 2006; Scruggs 2007),4 which is an adaptation of Esping-Andersen’s (1987, 1990) 
original measurement. Scruggs uses z-scores to combine information on five indicators into a 
single measurement that facilitates interpretation. The five indicators are: the level of benefits 
paid to the unemployed (replacement rate), the qualifying period, the duration of benefits 
payments, the waiting period before entitlement is available, and the percentage of the 
working-age population covered by the program (see Figure 5). The higher the benefits, the 
duration of payments, and the coverage, and the shorter the qualifying period and waiting 
time, the higher the degree of generosity (and vice versa). For more information see: 
http://cwed2.org/, where his dataset, the CWED2, is also publicly available (Scruggs, Jahn, 
and Kuitto 2014). 
For comparability with Scruggs’s measurement, we adapt Bambra’s measurement of 
the decommodification of health care (2005a, 2005b) for the construction of our health care 
generosity measurement, using the same z-score technique to combine the following 
indicators:5 Private health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, private hospital beds as a 
percentage of total bed stock, the coverage of the population by the public health care system, 
and household out-of-pocket (OOP) payments as a percentage of the total health 
expenditure.6 The majority of information concerning private health expenditure, private 
hospital beds, and household OOP payments for health is available at: 
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http://data.euro.who.int/hfadb/, and for the coverage percentages, we use data from the 
OECD (2012). 
 
[Figure 5 around here] 
 
For both country variables, we try to use as much as possible data for the periods 2004–2006 
and 2009-201 . Data for the year of the interview and the preceding year is used, because the 
respondents were asked whether they had sought professional help in the year before the 
interview, and because of the expected time lag. This also results in the best model fit. Both 
generosity measurements are interval-level variables, which are grand-mean centered. 
We also include additional macro-level control variables to guard against residual 
confounding. The effects of the nature of welfare policies concerning mental health and the 
MHC use of the unemployed may also partly depend on the condition of the country’s labor 
market and the general economic capacity (GDP per capita) of a country. A short period of 
income support for unemployed people, for example, may be less associated with high levels 
of anxiety and insecurity in countries where the level of unemployment is low and 
unemployment tends to be of short duration, compared with countries with high job 
insecurity and unemployment rates (Gallie, Kostova, and Kuchar 2001). In addition, we can 
expect that in countries with low unemployment, it will be less randomly distributed and as a 
result, will be more frequently considered a personal characteristic or a direct or indirect 
consequence of health selection. Unemployment will be more stigmatizing, different to the 
norm, and treated as an individualized problem (Clark et al. 2003), which can be triggers for 
medicalization. Therefore, GDP per capita (Model 3) and unemployment rates (Model 4) are 
included in the multilevel analyses as country level control variables. (Information is derived 
15 
 
from Eurostat). In addition to the generosity scores, GDP and unemployment rates per 
country are presented in Table 1. 
 Also disability generosity is included in the models as additional control variable in 
order to take the possibility of ‘hidden unemployment‘ via relying on disability benefits 
partly into account. In the literature (Börsch-Supan 2007), we found that generosity in terms 
of disability benefits are often measured by the level of public spending on disability. This 
information is available on Eurostat. In addition, although it was not the objective of this 
study, we cannot completely ignore the current debate about the claim that there is a 
movement from a passive toward an active welfare state in several European countries 
(Bonoli 2010). Central to this are Active Labor Market Programs (ALMP) (Knotz 2012; 
Knotz and Nelson 2013; Powell and Barrientos 2011; Strandh 2001). The level of 
expenditure on these programs is often used as an indicator for the activation effort of a 
country (Knotz 2012). Although we are aware that this is an approximate measurement, the 
expenditure on ALMP (as a percentage of GDP) is also included in the multilevel analysis as 
control variable. 
Based on the economic crisis literature (Antonakakis and Collins 2014, 2015; 
Karamessini and Rubery 2013; Karanikolos et al. 2013; Stuckler et al. 2009), cuts in 
government expenditure on domains as health, unemployment, active labor market programs, 
family and housing, are used as proxy of fiscal austerity. Data for general government final 
consumption expenditure as a % of GDP is collected from the World Bank World 
Development indicators database (WDI). In line with Antonakakis’ work (2015), we have 
divided general government final consumption expenditure by real GDP, as the expenditure 
measurement might be biased during a period when nominal GDP is falling. Because of a 
time lag of at least 1 year, information of 2005 for wave 64.4 (2005/2006) and 2009 for wave 
73.2 (2010) is used. We calculate the mean government expenditure over the periods per 
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country. The way in which the change in government expenditure is operationalized will be 
explained in the following section, as this is related to the statistical procedure we use. 
Country scores on the macro-variables are presented in Appendix B. 
 
Estimation 
Our analyses consist of two parts: In the first part (1), the focus is on country specific 
differences in the mental health care use of the unemployed and how these are patterned by 
country’s combination of unemployment generosity and health care generosity level. In the 
second part (2), we look for more general trends regarding the impact of the level of 
unemployment generosity and health care generosity on the relation between employment 
status and mental health care use, while taking several other important institutional (disability 
spending, total government spending and change therein) and macroeconomic factors (GDP, 
unemployment rate) into account. 
(1) Based on country-specific logistic regressions, we test the relationship between 
employment status and MHC use, and to what extent this association can be ascribed to 
mental health. To compare the MHC use of the unemployed with that of the employed 
between countries, predicted probabilities (PP) for the unemployed and employed are 
calculated based on the Odds ratios resulted from the logistic regression analyses7. The 
differences (PPunemployed-PPemployed) between both PP are presented in Table 2. The use of PP 
is preferable to reporting differences in logistic regression coefficients, because PP do not 
require the assumption that the error variance is identical across countries (Beckfield, 
Olafsdottir, and Bakhtiari 2013). First, the PP’s are based on the models controlled for age, 
gender, marital status, education and period. Second, they are based on the adjusted models 
including mental health. The results based on Model 2 are presented in a bar chart (Figure 7) 
and related to country scores on the generosity measurement of unemployment and of health 
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care. We have categorized the countries into ‘groups’ depending of whether country’s score 
is above or below the median score of all countries included in the study on the 
unemployment generosity and the health care generosity measure (See Figure 4 above). This 
has resulted in four groups of countries with a specific combination of scores: a relatively 
high level on both generosity measures, a relatively low level on both measures, and on one 
measurement a relatively high score and a low score on the other (and visa verse). The four 
groups of countries do thus not represent a typology consisting of 4 ‘types’ or are the results 
of a cluster analysis. They are just a pragmatic way to present our country specific results, 
which make it easier to discuss them in relation to the level of unemployment generosity and 
health care generosity.  
(2) In addition, to actually test whether unemployment and health care generosity 
have a significant moderating effect on the relationship between employment status and 
MHC use–irrespective of mental health–logistic multilevel analyses are performed, including 
cross-level interaction effects of employment status and the two generosity measurements. 
Multilevel analysis enables to take the clustering of our data in periods as well as countries 
into account. However two periods (2005/2006 and 2010) are not enough to use period as a 
separate level, and we face thus, like most repeated cross-sectional surveys, a problem of 
obtaining an adequate number of higher-level units at the period level (Van der Bracht and 
Van de Putte 2014). But, given the cross-national nature of the Eurobarometer, there is a 
solution to this lack of sufficient repeated waves, as has previously been described by 
Fairbrother (2014): considering the clustering of different waves clustered within countries. 
National-level time-series cross-sectional data has the advantage that it enables 
simultaneously modeling cross-sectional (or structural) effects that explain between-country 
differences, and longitudinal (or change) effects that explain within-country differences over 
time. 
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 In sum, as you can see on Figure 6, respondents, as units of the individual level (level 
1), are nested within country-years ranging from 2005/2006 to 2010 at the period level (level 
2), which are in turn nested within countries (level 3). To control for austerity measurements, 
we have estimated an additional model, where we take the average level of government 
expenditure into account as well as the change in expenditures. To include longitudinal (or 
change) effects at the period level and cross-sectional (or structural) effects of government 
expenditure at the country level in the same model, the longitudinal effects are group-mean 
centered, as described by Fairbrother (2014). Group-mean centering implies that the variables 
are measured as deviations from the group-mean, in this case the country mean of the 
government expenditure over the two periods. The cross-sectional effects at country level are 
grand-mean centered: the context variables are thus centered on the overall mean. In this way, 
the longitudinal effects of the change indicators are orthogonal to the cross-sectional effects.  
 
[Figure 6 around here] 
 
Seven models per outcome variable (GP and psychiatrist consultations) will be 
estimated: Model 1 includes only the individual variables, without controlling for mental 
health, in Model 2 mental health is added, Model 3 contains the moderation effect of 
unemployment and health care generosity, controlled for GDP and in Model 4, 5 and 6, we 
include each time another macro-control variable, respectively unemployment rate, public 
disability spending and ALMP expenditures. In the last model (Model 7), the austerity effects 
are estimated.  
 All models are estimated in the statistical software package MLwiN using Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation procedures, as this approach has been shown to be 
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robust, particularly when including cross-level interactions (Stegmueller 2013). We only 
consider random intercept models, as the random slopes are not significant. 
 The results (OR and 95% Confidence Interval) are presented in Table 3 for GP 
consultations and Table 4 for psychiatrist consultations. 
 
RESULTS 
First, we briefly examine the descriptive results, shown in Appendix A. The results confirm 
that in every European country, the unemployed have significantly worse mental health than 
the employed (tested by one-way ANOVA). Linked to the poorer mental health of the 
unemployed, the percentage of them who contact a GP/psychiatrist for mental health 
problems is higher than for the employed in most European countries. However, these 
differences are not significant for several countries, especially with regard to GP 
consultations (tested by Chi²).  
The country scores for the unemployment and health care generosity measurements 
are shown in Table 18. By combining them, we categorize the countries into four groups to 
make discussion of the results easier. In the first group, the countries included score relatively 
high (above the median) for both dimensions of generosity: Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Sweden, France and Ireland. The second group contains countries with a relatively high level 
of unemployment generosity, but a low level of health care generosity: Belgium Germany, 
Portugal, Spain, Latvia, and Bulgaria.  
 
“Table 1 About Here” 
 
The third group is characterized by low levels of unemployment generosity combined 
with relatively high levels of health care generosity: The United Kingdom, Slovenia, the 
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Czech Republic, Finland, Estonia, and Romania. In this group in particular, we therefore 
expect to find evidence for the medicalization of unemployment. The fourth group contains 
countries scoring low for both generosity measurements and only contains Southern and 
Eastern European countries: Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. As can 
be seen in the Table 1, also within the groups there are important differences. The UK and 
Romania are for example in the same group, but the level of protection of the unemployed in 
the UK is much higher than that of Romania.  
The differences between the predicted probabilities of the unemployed vs. the 
employed for MHC utilization are shown in Table 2. These are adjusted for mental health 
(Model 2) and presented per country and country group on the bar chart (Figure 7).  
 
“Table 2 About Here” 
 
With regard to GP consultations, it is apparent in Table 2 that in the majority of the 
countries, the higher likelihood of the unemployed contacting a GP–as observed in Model 1–
is no longer significant when adding mental health status to the model. The higher predicted 
probability of MHC utilization of the unemployed only remains significant (controlling for 
mental health) in Denmark and the Netherlands (group 1), and the UK and Slovenia (group 
3).  
In more than half of the countries–and dispersed over the four groups–the 
unemployed are more likely to consult physicians than the employed, controlling for the 
individual-level variables (Model 1, Table 2). However, when also controlling for reported 
mental health (Model 2), the higher probability of psychiatrist consultations for the 
unemployed only remains significant in Denmark (group 1), Germany (group 2), and 
Slovakia (group 4). In Spain, characterized by moderate unemployment generosity and low 
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health care generosity (group 2), the unemployed actually have a significantly lower 
probability of contacting a psychiatrist. As expected, group 3 has the most countries (the UK, 
Finland, and Slovenia) with a significantly higher predicted probability among the 
unemployed than the employed, after controlling for reported mental health.  
 
[Figure 7 (Bar chart) around here] 
 
To investigate whether countries’ unemployment rate and health care generosity have 
a significant moderating effect on the relationship between unemployment and medical care 
use, we examine the results of the multilevel analyses (Table 3). In Model 1, we observe that 
the likelihood of contacting a GP for mental health problems (OR=1.491; 95%CI[1.328-
1.679]) and contacting a psychiatrist (OR=2.557; 95%CI[2.002-3.232]) is significantly higher 
among the unemployed than the employed. After controlling for mental health status in 
Model 2, we see that the higher likelihood of contacting a GP for the unemployed 
(OR=1.103; 95%CI[ .976-1.244])is no longer significant. For psychiatrist consultations, this 
is only partly the case. However, the unemployed are still more likely to contact a psychiatrist 
(OR=2.557; 95%CI[2.002-3.232]) than the employed are, controlling for mental health.  
Despite the fact that we do not find evidence for medicalization of unemployment via 
GP consultations in Model 2, in Model 3 the results show that in countries with a high level 
of health care generosity (ORinteration term=1.083; 95%CI[1.031-1.139]) and/or unemployment 
generosity (OR=1.071; 95%CI[1.007- 1.141])), the unemployed have a higher likelihood of 
contacting a GP, controlling for mental health9. However, additional analyses performed 
separately for the countries with low and high unemployment rates (results not presented in 
table), show that the moderating effect of unemployment generosity is only significant in 
countries with a lower unemployment rate (OR=1.093; 95% CI[1.007-1.187]). Health care 
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generosity has also a significant effect on GP consultations for mental health problems of the 
employed (ORemployed=1.095; 95% CI[(1.014-1.176) but this positive effect was significantly 
lower than that on the mental health care use of the unemployed (ORunemployed=1.095 x 
1.083=1.186). Contacting a GP, regardless mental health status, is thus also among the 
employed (OR=1.095; 95%CI[(1.014-1.176]) more likely in countries with a higher level of 
health care generosity. The higher likelihood of contacting a psychiatrist among the 
unemployed compared to the employed is more pronounced in countries with high generosity 
of health care (ORinteraction term=1.081; 95%CI[1.011-1.156], see Model 3 of Table 4). Health 
care generosity has no significant effect on the psychiatrist consultations of the employed.  
 
“Table 3 About Here” 
 
These interaction effects with unemployment and the generosity measurements 
remain similar when the other control variables unemployment rate, public disability 
spending, and ALMP spending are taken into account, respectively in Model 4, 5 and 6. 
There were no significant associations between these macro variables and GP contacts as 
well as psychiatrist consultations. In the last model (Model 7), where we control for possible 
austerity effects by including the context and change variable of government expenditures the 
main results remain significant. However, a positive change in government expenditures has 
a positive effect on GP-consultations for emotional and psychosocial problems, net of the 
actual mental health status and the average level of government expenditures (OR=1.027; 
95%CI[1.003-1.052]). This means that in austerity contexts, cutbacks in government 
expenditures decrease the likelihood of contacting a GP, controlling for mental health. We 
also tested the interaction effect of change in government expenditures and employment 
status (results not presented in table) and we found that for psychiatrist consultations, only 
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among the employed there is an effect. In countries with a cut in government expenditures, 
the likelihood of contacting a psychiatrist has decreased among the employed, irrespective of 
their mental health status (ORemployed=1.075; 95% CI[1.011-1.142]). There is also a period 
effect on specialized mental health care use: the likelihood of contacting a psychiatrist is 
significantly lower in 2010 than in 2005-2006, which can also be interpreted as an association 
that is consistent with an austerity or recession effect (OR= .792; 95%CI[ .657-.958]). 
 
  “Table 4 About Here” 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, we addressed three research questions: Does the relationship between 
unemployment and mental health care use, controlling for reported mental health status, vary 
across European countries? Are these differences patterned by a combination of 
unemployment and health care generosity? And more generally, how is the level of 
unemployment generosity and health care generosity linked to the relationship between 
employment status and mental health care use, when other important institutional factors 
(public disability spending, changes in government spending, economic capacity, and labor 
market conditions) are taken into account?  
Before discussing the main findings, we note the key limitations of this study. The 
first limitation is the divergent timing between measurement of unemployment and 
measurement of MHC utilization. The main independent variable–employment status–
indicates the situation of respondents at the time of the interview. However, the items 
concerning professional care seeking refer to the preceding twelve months, and the period of 
reference for experiencing depressive feelings is the preceding month. As a result, we cannot 
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use time priority to bolster causal inferences. Accordingly, we addressed threats to causal 
inference in several other ways. Reverse causality is a concern if individuals with poorer 
health are more likely to be unemployed. Because we separate respondents who were inactive 
due to illness or disability from those who were unemployed, we reduce this possible reverse 
causality. The models were also re-estimated separately for countries with high 
unemployment rates and those with low unemployment rates, because we can expect that in 
countries with low unemployment rates, selection effects are more likely, as unemployment is 
less randomly dispersed. However, we did not find evidence consistent with this selection 
scenario. Nevertheless, with the available data, we are simply unable to confirm the direction 
of any causal effects. Based on the meta-analysis by Paul and Moser (2009), which also 
includes information concerning longitudinal studies, we know that the mental health 
selection effect on unemployment and job searching is relatively weak. Selection bias is 
possibly also more of a concern when the outcome variable of interest is mental health 
instead of MHC use, as it is less likely that the use of care has an impact on becoming 
unemployed, irrespective of mental health.  
Two additional limitations are also related to the source of survey data. First, the 
response rates for waves 64.4 and 73.2 of the Eurobarometer are not available from Eurostat 
or any other source. We are left with just one tool to address the representativeness of the 
Eurobarometer surveys: the post-stratification weights, which we do use. Second, income 
measurement is omitted from the Eurobarometer surveys we use, which prevents us from 
assessing the role of household material resources in accessing mental health care. 
Bearing in mind these limitations, our study produces three main findings. First, in 
addition to the fact that unemployment is consistently related to poorer mental health and 
general health (Bambra and Eikemo 2009), we find that in several European countries, 
unemployment is medicalized at least to some degree. This medicalization, which we 
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quantify as the remaining association between unemployment and MHC utilization, after 
controlling for reported mental health status, varies substantially across national context. In 
the UK, for example, the higher specialized care consumption of the unemployed compared 
to the employed remain after controlling for differences in mental health between the 
employed and unemployed. In Spain, the unemployed have a lower likelihood of contacting a 
psychiatrist regardless of their poorer mental health.  
Second, the variation in the extent of medicalization of unemployment is significantly 
patterned by a country’s level of unemployment generosity, and especially health care 
generosity. It is the institutional approach to welfare state effects on health (Beckfield et al. 
2015; Bergqvist, Yngwe, and Lundberg 2013), whereby unemployment and health care 
generosity are addressed as separate welfare domains (Kasza 2002; Bambra 2005a), that 
allows for this insight. In several countries, policy is generous in one domain but not the 
other. The UK is a good example of a country with a low level of unemployment generosity 
combined with a high level of health care generosity. Finland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, and Slovenia also have this combination. Based on our theoretical framework, this 
combination was hypothesized to create the most favorable institutional conditions for 
medicalizing unemployment. In line with this hypothesis, we found indeed that in the UK, 
Slovenia, Finland and Estonia, MHC utilization among the unemployed is significantly 
higher than expected based on their mental health, at least for one type of medical care (GP or 
psychiatrist consultations). Romania and the Czech Republic, however, did not confirm our 
hypothesis. In Romania this might be explained by its exceptionally low unemployment 
generosity, which may lead to high financial insecurity among the unemployed. In addition, 
Romania’s high health care generosity is in particular due to a very low provision of private 
hospitals and low private health expenditure.  
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Third, by testing the actual moderating effect of both generosity measurements on the 
relationship between unemployment and MHC use, a high level of health care generosity in 
particular is highlighted as an important institutional factor for unemployment medicalization 
via medical professionals. Bambra’s (2005a, 2005b) adjusted and updated health care 
generosity measurement accentuates the private-public mixture. A large proportion of private 
health insurance is provided through the workplace (Colombo and Tapay 2004). As a result, 
in countries with high expenditures on private health insurance and services, the employed 
often benefit more than the unemployed, for whom it is more difficult to use private services 
and to obtain private insurance (Colombo and Tapay 2004). Moreover, more private 
(insurance) expenditure, private service provision (relative to public expenditure and 
provision), and higher out-of-pocket payments increase social inequality in health care 
access, especially by harming the most vulnerable (Bambra, Garthwaite, and Hunter 2014), 
such as possibly the unemployed. By contrast, in countries with high health care generosity, 
the structural thresholds for contacting a medical professional are lower and the access to and 
availability of medical resources independent (or minimally dependent) of an individual’s 
position in the labor market and/or their economic capital. This may explain why we find that 
the unemployed in these countries are more likely to utilize mental health care services. 
Further qualitative and case specific research could be interesting to get a deeper insight in 
the proposed mechanisms as possible explanations and to consider other behavioral 
mechanisms. 
With regard to the role of unemployment generosity in the relationship between 
unemployment and GP consultations, the results contradict our expectations that a low level 
will trigger medicalization of unemployment. However, additional analyses show that this is 
only the case in countries with a relatively low unemployment rate. Therefore, in a context 
where the chances of (health) selection effects are higher, where unemployment is less 
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randomly distributed, and where any social-norm effect of unemployment is virtually absent 
(Clark et al. 2003), higher levels of unemployment generosity may strengthen the 
medicalization of unemployment via GP consultations. Denmark and the Netherlands have 
this combination of characteristics, and for these countries, we indeed find higher primary 
care use by the unemployed than expected based on their mental health. A possible 
explanation can be found in the pro-poor distribution of GP consultations, also when need is 
taken into account (van Doorslaer, Koolman, and Jones 2004). Both countries have also in 
common that they have a flexicurity labour market model. This is characterized by (i) 
minimal job protection, (ii) generous unemployment benefits, and (iii) extensive use of active 
labor market policies (Andersen, 2012; Heyes, 2011). Although we have controlled for 
expenditures on ALMP, specific types of programs, especially those which are compulsory 
and in some sense paternalistic, can act as an explanation for our findings. Previous work 
(Heggebo, 2015, 2016) has already indicated that people with ill health and hence more 
unstable labor market attachment, could be more prone to unemployment in a flexicurity 
model. Based on our study they also seem to be more vulnerable for medicalizing it.  
One of the strengths of the study is that we have taken possible austerity effects into 
account. In countries such as Greece and several Eastern European countries where there are 
cutbacks in general government expenditures between 2005 and 2009, the likelihood of 
contacting a GP for emotional or psychosocial problems was lower compared to countries 
without a decrease in government expenditures, controlling for individual mental health 
status and the average level of government expenditures. In several countries, the GP has a 
gate keeper function (Wendt 2014), referring patients to the most adequate care, which makes 
this finding especially worrisome. Also other recent studies (De Vogli 2013; Kondilis et al. 
2013; Kondilis et al. 2012; McKee et al. 2012) have already warned of austerity effects on 
health outcomes.  
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While we found in general that psychiatrist consultations were reduced in 2010 
compared to 2005-2006, only psychiatrist consultations of the employed were less likely in 
countries with a cut in government expenditures. In previous research (Buffel, van de Straat, 
and Bracke 2015), we found that in countries with a decline in the GDP growth rate (as 
indicators of the strength of the recession) the employed are less likely to contact a 
psychiatrist, controlling for their mental health. A possible explanation for the findings that 
the austerity effect and the crisis effect only applies to working people may be that the 
employed may avoid specialized care use for fear of being labeled as sick and thus acquiring 
a treatment stigma (de Belvis et al. 2012). In slack labor markets, such stigma could more 
easily result in job loss (Gene-Badia et al. 2012), perhaps especially in countries most 
strongly affected by the economic crisis and austerity policies.  
 In addition, our models incorporated the level of public disability spending, as studies 
have already observed that a high level of spending (especially in countries with less 
generous unemployment benefits) can lead to ‘hidden unemployment’, which can also be 
interpreted as a kind of medicalization of unemployment via relying on disability benefits. 
Future research is needed to disentangle more directly this part of medicalization of 
unemployment, as has already been done for ‘the pathologization of poverty’ (Hansen, 
Bourgois, andDrucker 2014) or ‘monetizing illness’ (O'Brien 2015) 
Finally, related to the recent activation debate, some researchers are also focusing on 
the shifting balance between the rights and responsibilities of the unemployed and the 
growing conditionality requirements for unemployment benefits (Knotz 2012; Knotz and 
Nelson 2013). We need to be cautious about our results in this regard, because Knotz argues 
that if there is increasing conditionality, generosity scores will be less accurate (Knotz 2013). 
For example, if there is a reasonably generous unemployment benefits system, but the 
unemployed cannot refuse certain jobs without losing their entitlements, generosity is not that 
29 
 
high, as it refers to the fact that the benefit claimants are more dependent on the labor market. 
This may be a possible explanation for why we find convincing support for the expected 
positive relation between health care generosity and medicalizing unemployment, and less 
support for the hypothesized negative relation with unemployment generosity.  
 
Acknowledgments 
This paper is presented at the Special interest meeting of ESHMS (2015), Trondheim, 
Norway, 03-04 September, 2015.  
 
Notes 
1. As a test for the validity of the data, we calculated the correlation between countries’ 
unemployment rates derived from the Eurobarometer data, and the Eurostat national data 
(une_rt_a). The correlation is  .789 (wave 2010) and  .813 (wave 2005–2006). 
Additionally, we compared the Eurobarometer data (2005/6–2010) with the waves for 
2006–2012 of the European Social Survey, which also include information about mental 
health (however, not on MHC use) and employment status (per country). The correlations 
are relatively high (see additional material Table A for more detailed information). 
2. Frohlich and colleagues (2001), they conclude that when the aggregated units, make 
sense, theoretically as units, in our case countries, it is more appropriate to carry out the 
analyses without weighting by the size of the unities. Unweighted analyses yield 
estimations that are more valid. Frohlich and colleagues (2001) also indicate that they 
know of no studies showing that the size of the population or a country, in itself affects 
the health status and need for health care services of the population. Hence, they state that 
it is not appropriate to weight analyses by the size of the population.  
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3. Type of community is only included as a control variable in the multilevel analyses, as 
the country-specific samples are too small to control in the country-specific logistic 
analyses; also for this additional variable. 
4. For some countries (especially Eastern and Central European), the unemployment 
generosity index was not available; only the separate indicators. We calculated the index 
for these countries based on the formula of Scruggs (Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto 2014). As 
a validity check, we did the same for the countries for which we have the unemployment 
generosity score. The correlation between our own calculations and Scruggs’ scores was 
nearly 1 (r =  .987). 
5. Bambra’s measurement (2005a, 2005b) is only constructed based on the initial OECD 
countries, similar to the work of Esping-Anderson (Yu 2012). In our study, we only focus 
on European countries. As a result, there is less variation in the indicator of coverage, as 
almost every European country has a full coverage rate (near 100%). In addition, several 
Central and Eastern European countries are included in our study. For these countries, 
Bambra’s measurement could give an incorrect reflection of the real situation. Based on 
her three indicators of decommodification, some Central and Eastern European countries 
have relatively high scores (see additional information in Appendix B), compared with 
other countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. This can mainly be 
ascribed to the fact that some of them still have very little private health care provision in 
terms of hospital beds (Yu 2012), despite the general trend toward privatization (King, 
Hamm, and Stuckler 2009). Nevertheless, it is known that their health care systems are 
less developed, especially concerning MHC services (Eikemo et al. 2008; WHO 2005, 
2011). The process of privatization in these countries has in particular led to higher OOP 
payments, which restricts the accessibility of health care services for the more vulnerable 
groups, such as the unemployed (King, Hamm, and Stuckler 2009). Research has 
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observed that the proportion of private health insurance spending is not necessary related 
to household OOP spending as a proportion of total expenditure on health (Quesnel-
Vallée et al. 2012). For example, in Estonia, Poland, and Hungary, expenditure on private 
health insurance is almost nonexistent, but OOP payments are relatively high (Quesnel-
Vallée et al. 2012). This is a good indicator for assessing the accessibility of health care 
services and detecting financial barriers. Further, the increase in OOP payments and 
patients’ fees is related to greater social inequality in the access to health care (Bambra, 
Garthwaite, and Hunter 2014). Therefore we add this indicator, measured as the 
household OOP payments as percentage of the total health expenditure, to Bambra’s 
health care decommodification measurement. 
6. By measuring the indicator in this way, we avoid the problem that it will also be an 
indicator of use, such as our outcome variable. 
7.  The following formula is used: Predicted probability of the employed= [exp(a + b1X1 + 
b2X2)] / [1 + exp(a + b1X1 + b2X2)]. To compute the PP with this formula, we have 
used the mean score for the metric independent variables, and the proportions for the 
categorical variables.  
8. In Table 2, the coefficients for unemployed mental health status compared with those of 
the employed are also shown, controlled for age, gender, education, period, and marital 
status. The results are similar to these of the bivariate analyses (comparing means and 
ANOVA tests). 
9. Second-order interactions (unemployment generosity x health care generosity x 
employment status) are insignificant for the three outcome variables. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Country scores on the generosity  measurement of unemployment and health care, 
and countries' national unemployment rate and GDP 
   
      Unemployment 
generosity 
Health care 
generosity 
Unemployment 
rate 
GDP per 
capita    
    Country  (a)   (b) (c) (c)  
1 
High unemployment 
generosity and 
high health care 
generosity 
 
Austria 1 .42 12.04 5.5 31450 
Denmark 1 .60 15.24 5.4 39400 
The Netherlands 11.94 14.12 5.3 33100 
Sweden 1 .08 13.52 7.8 32250 
France 11.24 13.50 9.0 28300 
Ireland 1 .64 13.39 7.0 37500 
2 
High unemployment 
generosity and 
low health care 
generosity 
 
Belgium 13.72 9.45 8.3 30300 
Germany 1 .30 9.89 9.7 28000 
Portugal 1 .50 9.31 9.1 15250 
Spain 11.04 1 .70 12.7 21900 
Latvia 11.35 8.30 13.1 7200 
Bulgaria 11.55 7.46 9.7 3800 
3 
Low unemployment 
generosity and 
high health care 
generosity 
 
The UK 8.70 15.77 5.7 28350 
Slovenia 9.51 14.79 6.2 15850 
The Czech Republic 9.73 15.95 7.6 11900 
Finland 9.22 13.10 8.5 31150 
Estonia 8.37 12.94 1 .5 9350 
Romania 5.68 14.45 7.2 4750 
4 
Low unemployment 
generosity and 
low health care 
generosity 
 
Greece 7.38 7.39 1 .1 19050 
Hungary 7.59 11.62 7.8 8950 
Italy 5.64 11.72 7.8 24850 
Lithuania 7.51 11.62 11.0 7350 
Poland 6.79 11.08 15.0 7250 
Slovakia 7.50 11.49 15.6 9350 
Note: Source (a)  CWED 2 data (generosity unemployment index; for countries without information on index, own 
calculations via Scruggs formula based on information of CWED 2 on the separate indicators); (b) Data from Eurostat, 
OECD and WHO, own calculations via formula of Scruggs; (c) Eurostat 
44 
 
Table 2: Mental health and MHC use by the unemployed compared with the employed per country  
 
 
    
Mental Health 
GP 
consultations 
Psychiatrist 
consultations 
 
     b1 sig. M1 sig. M2 sig. M1 sig. M2 sig. 
1 
 Austria -.471 ***  .122 ***  .028   .032 **  .007  
High unemployment Denmark -.258 ***  .113 ***  .077 *  .054 ***  .031 ** 
generosity and Netherlands -.354 ***  .085 **  .044 a  .039 *  .012  
high health care Sweden -.269 *** -.028  -.052  -.011  -.012  
generosity France -.173 *  .016  -.010   .023 *  .005  
 Ireland -.214 ***  .036  -.005   .006 a   .002  
2 
 Belgium -.169 **  .020    .001   .006   -.001   
High unemployment Germany -.253 ***  .051 ***  .011   .061 ***  .024 *** 
generosity and Portugal -.322 ***  .021  -.014   .026 *  .007  
low health care Spain -.170 **  .046 **  .025  -.007  -.005 * 
generosity Latvia -.225 ***  .020   .000   .006 **  .001  
 Bulgaria -.256 ***  .019 a  .009  -.004  -.002  
3 
 United Kingdom -.341 ***  .135 ***  .071 **  .015 *  .008 a 
Low unemployment Slovenia -.106 a  .070 ***  .056 **  .017   .003  
generosity and Czech Republic -.303 ***  .031 a  .004   .012 a  .001  
high health care Finland -.135 *  .017   .000   .044 **  .026 * 
generosity Estonia -.371 ***  .056 *  .013   .028 **  .008 * 
  Romania -.343 ***  .023   -.007   .011 a  .003   
4 
 Greece -.324 ***  .005   -.008   .002   -.001   
Low unemployment Hungary -.197 ** -.010  -.019   .027 *  .006  
generosity and Italy -.118 a  .030   .016  -.003  -.002  
low health care Lithuania -.166 **  .038 *  .020   .017 *  .005  
generosity Poland -.218 *** -.003  -.015   .004   .001  
  Slovakia -.169 **  .014   -.001   .033 **  .012 * 
 
1 b: The estimated coefficient of the unemployed (ref. employed) on mental health (MHI-5), while controlling for age, gender, education, period, and marital status. 
2 M1: the difference between the predicted probability of the unemployed and the employed, controlled for age, gender, marital status, education, and  period. 
3 M2: also adjusted for mental health status 
The countries are presented in four groups depending of whether country’s score is above or below the median score of all countries included in the study on the unemployment  
generosity and the health care generosity measure (See Figure 4 above).    
 p < .100  *p < .050  **p < .010  ***p < .001 (two-tailed)         
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 Table 3: Logistic multilevel analysis on GP consultations 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  
 OR (CI)  OR (CI)  OR (CI)  OR (CI)  OR (CI)  OR (CI)  OR (CI)  
Constant  .081***   .058***   .073***   .072***   .072***   .072***   .067***  
Employment status (.066  -  .099) (.095  -  .095) (.057  -  .089) (.057  -  .090) (.058  -  .091) (.057  -  .089) (.050  -  .089) 
Unemployed 1.491***   .976***  1.105***  1.103  1.105  1.107***  1.104***  
 (1.328  - 1.679) (1.244  - 1.244) (.977  - 1.247) (.979  - 1.244) (.976  - 1.247) (.979  - 1.249) (.977  - 1.251) 
Nonemployed 1.394***  1.122***  1.221***  1.222***  1.222***  1.224***  1.221***  
 (1.287  - 1.514) (1.328  - 1.328) (1.124  - 1.328) (1.121  - 1.329) (1.123  - 1.330) (1.124  - 1.332) (1.121  - 1.330) 
Age 1.014***  1.008***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  1.011***  
Gender (ref. men) (1.011  - 1.017) (1.014  - 1.015) (1.008  - 1.014) (1.008  - 1.014) (1.008  - 1.014) (1.008  - 1.014) (1.008  - 1.014) 
Women 1.407***  1.178***  1.273***  1.273***  1.272***  1.273***  1.274***  
 (1.308  - 1.512) (1.372  - 1.372) (1.179  - 1.375) (1.180  - 1.375) (1.180  - 1.373) (1.180  - 1.373) (1.182  - 1.376) 
Mental health    .350***   .366***   .366***   .366***   .366***   .366***  
Period (ref. 2005)   (.385  -  .385) (.349  -  .384) (.349  -  .384) (.349  -  .384) (.349  -  .384) (.349  -  .384) 
2010 1.184  1.117  1.108  1.114  1.117  1.121  1.207**  
 (.997  - 1.399) (.939- 1.317) (.917  - 1.333) (.943  - 1.334) (.916  - 1.326) (.931  - 1.336) (1.000  - 1.455) 
Unemployment generosity     1.009  1.021  1.006   .994  1.022  
     (.921  - 1.103) (.936  - 1.115) (.908  - 1.101) (.900  - 1.102) (.938  - 1.120) 
Health care generosity     1.095**  1.108**  1.085*  1.091*  1.103*  
Cross-level inteaction effects     (1.014  - 1.176) (1.018  - 1.208) (1.005  - 1.171) (1.017  - 1.166) (1.022  - 1.184) 
Unemployed x unemployment generosity     1.072*  1.072*  1.072*  1.072*  1.071*  
     (1.007  - 1.141) (1.006  - 1.140) (1.006  - 1.142) (1.007  - 1.143) (1.007  - 1.142) 
Non-employed x unemployment generosity     1.009  1.010  1.010  1.010  1.010  
     (.973  - 1.048) (.973  - 1.049) (.972  - 1.049) (.973  - 1.050) (.972  - 1.049) 
Unemployed x health care generosity     1.083**  1.083**  1.084**  1.083**  1.083**  
     (1.030  - 1.140) (1.029  - 1.141) (1.030  - 1.141) (1.030  - 1.138) (1.029  - 1.140) 
Non-employed x Health care generosity      .997   .997   .998   .998   .998  
Macro control variables     (.965  - 1.031) (.964  - 1.031) (.965  - 1.032) (.964  - 1.032) (.966  - 1.034) 
GDP(x1000)     1.030          
     (.868  - 1.219)         
Unemployment rate       
1.007 
(.938  - 
 
1.078) 
      
Public expenditures on disability (x100)         1.015     
         (.969  -  1.001)     
Active Labor Marktet Programs Expenditures           1.241    
 
Goverment expenditures 
          (.745  - 2.007) 1.002  
             (.988  - 1.016) 
Change goverment expenditures             1.028*  
             (1.001  - 1.058) 
Variance: Country  .108   .155   .101   .102   .106   .101   .107  
 (.037  -  .240) (.050  -  .343) (.010  -  .251) (.006  -  .254) (.016  -  .254) (.017  -  .258 (.005  -  .260) 
               County x period  .058   .064   .071   .072   .068   .068   .060  
 (.025  -  .140) (.028  -  .160) (.030  -  .174) (.030  -  .196) (.030  -  .169) (.029  -  .163 (.025  -  .177) 
Note: Models controlled for education, marital status, type of communities, and period; The metric variables are grand-mean centered;  *p < .050 **p < .010 ***p < .001 (two-tailed)  
Three level design: individuals (n=36,306; level 1) are nested in country-years (n=48, level 2), which are nested in countries (n=24, level 3) 
46 
 
Table 4: Logistic multilevel analysis on psychiatrist consultations  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
  OR CI  OR CI  OR CI  OR CI  OR CI  OR CI  OR CI  
Constant  .009***  .006***  .006***  .006***  .006***  .006***  .007*** 
Employment status (.006  -  .013) (.004   -  .009) (.004  -  .009) (.004  -  .009) (.004  -  .009) (.004  -  .009) (.004  -  .013) 
Unemployed 2.557*** 1.605*** 1.636*** 1.636**  1.637*** 1.642*** 1.644*** 
 (2.002  - 3.232) (1.247  - 2.052) (1.261  -  2.104) (1.264  - 2.090) (1.265  - 2.098) (1.276  - 2.109) (1.272  - 2.111) 
Nonemployed 2.560*** 1.998*** 2.038*** 2.038*** 2.042*** 2.042*** 2.044*** 
 (2.130  - 3.068) (1.662  - 2.401) (1.692  - 2.469) (1.687  - 2.462) (1.697  - 2.457) (1.687  - 2.472) (1.689  - 2.472) 
Age 1.007  1.001  1.001  1.001  1.001  1.001  1.001  
Gender (ref. men) (1.000  - 1.013) (.994  - 1.009) (.994  - 1.009) (.994  - 1.008) (.994  - 1.000) (.994  - 1.008) (.994  -  1.008) 
Women 1.225**  1.043  1.045  1.042  1.042  1.044  1.043  
 (1.039  - 1.457) (.881  - 1.236) (.882  - 1.239) (.881  - 1.234) (.878  - 1.232) (.878  - 1.240) (.883  - 1.234) 
Mental health    .246***  .245***  .245***  .245***  .244***  .245*** 
Period (ref. 2005)   (.223  -  .272) (.223  -  .270) (.222  -  .269) (.222  -  .270) (.222  -  .269) (.223  -  .270) 
2010  .820   .792***  .791***  .790***  .791***  .794***  .841  
 (.685  -  .981)** (.657  -  .958) (.651  -  .947) (.647  -  .951) (.655  -  .960) (.656  -  .957) (.688  - 1.023) 
Unemployment generosity     1.171  1.171  1.115  1.115  1.171  
     (.984  - 1.394) (.984  - 1.394) (.926  - 1.320) (.926  - 1.320) (.984  - 1.394) 
Health care generosity     1.084  1.117  1.050  1.054  1.058  
Cross-level inteaction effects     (.951  - 1.239) (.968  - 1.293) (.924  - 1.191) (.931  - 1.200) (.935  - 1.207) 
Unemployed x unemployment generosity      .940   .940   .941   .940   .936  
     (.824  - 1.071) (.825  - 1.070) (.823  - 1.074) (.825  - 1.069) (.821  - 1.068) 
Non-employed x unemployment generosity      .923   .922   .923   .923   .920  
     (.842  - 1.012) (.840  - 1.010) (.839  - 1.013) (.839  - 1.010) (.839  - 1.011) 
Unemployed x health care generosity     1.081*  1.081*  1.081*  1.081*  1.067*  
     (1.011  - 1.156) (1.011  - 1.156) (1.011  - 1.156) (1.011  - 1.156) (1.009  - 1.149) 
Non-employed x Health care generosity     1.015  1.017  1.016  1.017  1.015  
Macro control variables     (.938  - 1.096) (.943  - 1.097) (.940  - 1.099) (.941  - 1.099) (.939  - 1.094) 
GDP(x1000)     1.007          
     (.748  - 1.344)         
Unemployment rate       1.005        
      (.937  - 1.186)       
Public expenditures on disability (x100)        1.032      
       (.940  - 1.101)     
Active Labor Marktet Programs Expenditures         1.872    
           (.908  - 4.450)   
Goverment expenditures              .983  
             (.958  - 1.012) 
Change goverment expenditures             1.031  
             (.993  - 1.076) 
Variance: Country  .245    .438    .369    .354    .344    .327    .345  
 (.107  -  .539) (.222  -  .900) (.175  -  .830) (.167  -  .787) (.161  -  .758) (.151  -  .751) (.159  -  .730) 
               County x period  .014   .013   .015   .018   .017   .016   .014  
  (.001  -  .107) (.001  -  .107) (.001  -  .100) (.001  -  .117) (.001  -  .112) (.001  -  .106) (.001  -    .145) 
Models controlled for education, marital status, type of communities, and period; The metric variables are grand-mean centered; *p < .050 **p < .010 ***p < .001 (two-tailed)   
Three level design: individuals (n=36,306; level 1) are nested in country-years (n=48, level 2), which are nested in countries (n=24, level 3) 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Theoretical model at the individual level: medicalization of unemployment 
 
 
Figure 2.a: Theoretical model of the role of unemployment generosity, a combination of macro-
level and individual level 
 
 
Figure 2.b: Theoretical model of the role of health care generosity, a combination of macro-
level and individual level 
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Figure 3: Hypothesis concerning the impact of the combination of unemployment generosity 
and health care generosity 
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Figure 4: Countries positioned in the two-dimensional graph of the unemployment generosity 
and the health care generosity measure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Unemployment generosity scores based on the CWED 2 data (for countries without 
information on index, own calculations via Scruggs formula based on information of CWED 2 
on the separate indicators); Health care generosity score based on data from Eurostat, OECD 
and WHO, own calculations via formula of Scruggs.
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Figure 5: The indicators of the unemployment generosity measure and the health care 
generosity measure.  
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Figure 6: Presentation of the three-level design 
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Figure 7: Bar chart, PP unemployed – PP employed on mental health care MHC use per  
country,  all adjusted for mental health and individual control variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The predicted probabilities are based on the results of the country specific logistic 
regression analyses.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Samples size and mental health and mental health care use of the employed and unemployed per country 
Country   Mean MH-score % GP consultations  % Psychiatrist consultations  
 sample size employed unemployed employed unemployed employed unemployed   
Austria 1,586  3.84 3.34 9.5 22.2 .9 4.8   
Belgium 1,483  3.95 3.67 9.2 13.8 2.1 2.9   
Bulgaria 1,443  3.76 3.46 4.7 7.5 .6 .6   
The Czech Republic 1,590  3.87 3.56 6.4 9.3 1.3 2.9   
Denmark 1,411  4.09 3.78 11.2 23.1 .7 6.6   
Estonia 1,349  3.77 3.36 1.8 16.9 1.9 7.0   
Finland 1,336  4.11 3.90 5.2 8.0 1.4 7.0   
France 1,513  3.92 3.65 1.0 13.4 1.9 3.9   
Germany 2,231  3.87 3.57 7.4 13.2 1.3 5.1   
Greece 1,501  3.56 3.19 4.3 5.1 .9 1.3   
Hungary 1,481  3.85 3.61 6.9 6.6 1.8 5.1   
Ireland 1,560  3.98 3.71 9.9 12.7 .2 1.7   
Italy 1,598  3.55 3.43 8.7 9.4 .5 .1   
Latvia 1,451  3.61 3.35 7.6 9.5 .1 1.2   
Lithuania 1,369  3.71 3.50 9.1 13.5 1.3 3.5   
The Netherlands 1,623  4.11 3.66 7.4 18.8 1.8 6.2   
Poland 1,472  3.87 3.57 5.6 6.7 .6 1.3   
Portugal 1,302  3.81 3.43 11.2 14.9 2.0 5.2   
Romania 1,410  3.73 3.35 19.0 2.0 .1 1.1   
Slovakia 1,613  3.90 3.70 12.1 13.2 .5 3.7   
Slovenia 1,419  3.86 3.73 4.2 12.3 1.4 3.3   
Spain 1,384  3.91 3.68 5.4 11.1 1.3 .5   
Sweden 1,401  4.15 3.86 8.0 5.5 1.5 .1   
The UK 1,780  3.98 3.57 8.4 25.0 .5 2.4   
Total 36,306          
Mean    3.87 3.57 8.43 12.99 1.11 3.23   
 
 
54 
 
Appendix B: Additional information, Bambra’s health care decommodification 
measurement, Public expenditures on disability and ALMP, and Total government spending 
  Health care generosity 
Public 
expenditure  
Public 
expenditure 
Total  goverment 
 
Measure based on only 
the  
on disability  on ALMP  spending/ GDP 
  
three indicators of 
Bambra's index (1) 
mean (2) 
(as % of 
GDP) (3) 
2009 - (mean of 
2005 & 2009) (4) 
Austria 11.14 692.96 .72 -.12 
Belgium 9.35 588.74 1.21 -.01 
Bulgaria 11.67 45.45 .10 -13.35 
The Czech 
Republic 
14.33 154.10 .27 -2.39 
Denmark 14.03 1583.06 1.73 .27 
Estonia 13.21 128.07 .13 .04 
Finland 13.12 1039.91 .95 .17 
France 1.90 513.99 .98 -.11 
Germany 8.50 633.37 .98 -.03 
Greece 1.14 224.95 .33 -.12 
Hungary 12.76 182.77 .42 -.43 
Ireland 12.26 403.34 .75 .78 
Italy 11.95 371.65 .52 .10 
Latvia 12.32 66.39 .50 -4.29 
Lithuania 13.79 109.60 .40 -2.01 
The Netherlands 11.46 812.01 1.26 .27 
Poland 12.32 127.62 .51 -2.70 
Portugal 1.31 325.15 .68 -.48 
Romania 14.77 64.16 .09 -7.53 
Slovakia 12.46 109.52 .30 -4.15 
Slovenia 13.22 273.55 .33 -.69 
Spain 11.04 335.43 .82 .37 
Sweden 12.87 1499.58 1.10 .39 
The United 
Kingdom 
14.04 667.45 .40 1.08 
Source: 1. Data from Eurostat, OECD, and WHO; own calculations via formula of Scruggs. 
2. Eurobarometer data 
3. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/24_almp_and_employment_services.pdf.  
4. Final consumption expenditure as a % of GDP is collected from the WDI database; and the general 
government expenditure is divided by country's real GDP. 
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